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G« Jaynes, M. Okuno and D. Schmeidler
I. INTRODUCTION
L. Shapley in collaboration with M. Shubik has presented several
variants of a pure exchange economy model where money (fiat or commodity) serves
as the medium of exchange. More specifically, each commodity is exchanged
for money in a market where buyers bid money and sellers offer
quantities of the commodity. Each buyer receives the portion of
the aggregate amount of the commodity equal to the proportion of his bid
to the aggregate bids, and vice versa for sellers.
This mechanism of exchange has several advantages over the
Walrasian market mechanism. In a "thin" market, the mechanism does not
presume price taking behavior among traders. On the other hand, the optimizing
behavior of a trader in a market with many small traders is essentially
that of a price taker. Hence, the difference between oligopolistic and
competitive behavior is determined endogeneously. Another advantage of
this model is that it distinguishes between feasible and optimal actions
of economic agents. In the Walrasian analysis, there is no room for non-
optimal behavior. Finally, the role of money and credit is naturally
incorporated in the model. For more details, see papers by Shapley and
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by Shubik in the references.
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the efficiency properties
of equilibria resulting from the Snaplay-Shubik mechanism in a perfectly
competitive economy with fiat money, i.e., money without any intrinsic
value. The purely competitive feature of the economy is captured by repre-
senting economic agents by an atomless measure space. Even then, Nash
equilibria of such an economy are not always efficient. The main results of
this paper consist of a characterization of those Nash equilibria which are
Pareto efficient and their relations to the Walras equilibria in Aumann's market
with a continuum of traders. Since most of the variants of Shapley's
model [2] are meaningless with fiat money (as opposed to commodity money),
a different variant is discussed in this paper. The description of an
economy in this paper is that of Aumann's with the addition of an initial
allocation of money agents. In this respect, we have a straightforward
extension of the Shapley-Shubik model to a market with a continuum of
traders. We interpret the initial allocation of money as a credit from bank
which must be returned after trade ends. In this sense, the model is dif-
ferent from tiiose in [2] where trader .:= accept money for consumption. The
vsual interpretation of Nash equilibrium (which is relevant here) is that
each player realizes his expectations about the behavior of others resulting
from playing the same game repeatedly. In this interpretation, it is natural
to assume that an agent ends up with the same amount of money he started with
in order to play the same game again. This interpretation makes it plausible
to restrict our attention to Nash equilibria which are Pareto efficient.
In Section II, the model is explained and our main results are
stated. Proofs for these results as well as an example are given in Section IT
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II. THE EXCHANGE GAME AND MAIN RESULTS
An economic environment E is a quadruple {T, R , ( u
t
) tfT »
w ^
T is the set of traders, assumed to be the unit interval endowed with
the Lebegue measure X ; R" is the commodity space and each trader's
consumption possibility set; u : R * R is the utility function of trader
* n a
t ; w : T -» R, is a non-negative vector-valued function with w(t)
?representing the initial endowment of trader t , and each coordinate of w
w where w = (w , . .., w ) , is integrable. We also introduce u : T -*• R »T
an integrable non-negative valued function representing the initial endowment
of money to the traders. Pi is the set of all initial profiles of money, i.e..,
f?L« {p : T -> R |y is integrable} .
Let M (i = l,...,n) be the market where good i is traded.
Trader t £ T chooses a strategy which is a signal sent to each market. A
i i i
signal to M by t , s « (x , z ) , is a pair of non-negative real numbers
with z being the amount of good i trader t intends to supply to M.
and x being the amount of money t pays for the amount of i-th good he
wishes to purchase. Trader t's individual signal is a pair of n vectors
= ( \ — ( ^
nl n.
" i * i A iA T-signal to M. , a = (x , £ ) , is a pair of real-valued
integrable functions each of which maps T to R , representing the profile
"T
.
* A *1
~n ~1 *n
of signals sent to M over all traders, a » (x, O m (x >«">X » C >•••>£ )
is a T-signal and we denote Jo « (jx, jl) = (jx , ...,/x . j€ , ... ,jl )
where Jx* s / X^tOdX and /J
1
= j ^(OdX .
T A T
Given T-signals a , each market M, allocates the i-th good and
money it receives to traders according to their individual signals. While

II-2
the actual market allocation mechanism will be explained later, we denote
the amount of i-th good trader t receives from M. if T-strategy a
prevails and t chooses his individual strategy s by d (a, s ) and
i
the amount of money he receives from M under the same condition by
^
t
(a, s
t
) . Let d (a, s
r
) * (d
t
(o, s
t
>, ... , d (a, s )) and
n i /"
M<J, 3J * A M°» s ,-> •£. L. i=l *- *"
Whenchoosing individual signals, trader t faces economic constraint;
First, we assume he can send signals only once. Therefore, his signals must
A.
be bounded by his initial endowment w(t) and his initial amount of money
y-(t) . Namely, trader t can choose his individual signal s only from
the following set
a
t
(a) -<• - (x
t§
z
fc
) €R
+
I
2n
z < w(t) and
t -
n i A
£ x_ < y(t)
i=l t
\.
Second, money we wish to analyze in this model is fiat money, or
money which possesses no intrinsic va'ue. Hence, money is indispensable to
make transactions (as will become clear later) but would become worthless
once transactions took place. Therefore, we need a setup so that
traders retain incentives to hold money after transactions are completed.
For this purpose, we assume that each trader must pay prohibitive penalty if
he ends up with a smaller amount of money than he is endowed with. Thus,
nobody wants to choose signals which force him to pay such a penalty.
Trader t , therefore, will choose his individual signals from
2n
3. (a) - {s. « (x . z ) € R,
t t t t +
I (a, s )
t t
> s x;>
i=l t
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We call individual signal s feasible if it is in a (a) C\ 3 (5)
.
t t t
One might justify the above formulation by the following story.
The initial ei»dowment of money takes the form of an interest free loan from
the central bank and must be repaid at the end of trading unless traders
pay a prohibitive penalty. An alternative interpretation is that the
economy we are analyzing is of a dynamic nature. The economy repeats period after
period and we are only interested in a stationary state. We need to obtain
the same amount of money holdings both at the beginning and at the end of
the period for this purpose. This second interpretation enables us to
discuss long-run equilibrium.
We consider market M of the following type. Provided that
t's individual signal is feasible, M allocates money and i-th good so
that the proportion of money t receives to that traders altogether receive
from M is equal to the ratio of t's supply signal to the economy's
aggregate supply signal to M
, The proportion of i-th good t recei . >
to all traders' receipt equals the ratio of t's demand signal to the
aggregate signal. That is
-^ z
1
if s e aAa) D 6 (°) and fr 1 *
r c
i t t t t J ^
t t \
' otherwise
and
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ti
i-fj x* if s € a (a) fl (a) and /J
1
=
jx
d^(a, s
t
) »\
|
otherwise
In order to associate our model with the traditional Walras model,
r "i fi
we might interpret jx /j£ as the monetary price of the i-th good associated
with T-strategy a - (x, 5).
* n
A consumption allocation y : T -* R is a vector valued integrable
/* r /- aY = jw . A consumption allocation y is called a
consumption outcome under T-strategy a if
y(t) « w(t) + dja, a(t)) - |(t)
a . e . in T
.
Given this formulation, one can construct a game
r {T, £ (h.) __} where T is the set of all players which is the same T
t tcl
as before; I = R is the strategy set common to all players.
Denote by Jh the set of all T-strateg:es which are integrable, i.e.,
5
- (X, i) € h lf Jx
1
< °° and Ji
i<
-%. h
t
:^x Z-vR
+
is t~th
player's payoff function such that
h
t
(a, s ) = u (w(t) + d
t
(a, s
t
> - zj
for all t
€
T
, o 6 *f and s«. 6 2 .t
Let us define the following.

II-5
Definition 1: A consumption allocation y and a vector p £ R, is a
— +
Walras equilibrium if a . e . in T
P • Y(t) < P * w(t)
and u
.
(y(t)) > u (c) V c with p • c < p • w(t)
Definition 2 : A consumption allocation y is Pareto efficient if there is
no other consumption allocation y 1 and a subset S £ T with non-zero
measure such that
u (y
f (t)) > u fy(t)) a.e. in T
and
u
t
(y'(c)) > u
t
(y(t)) ¥ t 6 S .
Definition 3 : A T-strategy a £ y£ is a Nash equilibrium if a.e.t in T
o(t)
€
o
t
(a) 3
fc
(a)
and
\(s, o(t)) £ h
t
(o, s
t
) V s
fc
€
2
Under an assumption (A) u («) is continuous, concave and
exhibits monotonicity for all t , we prove the following.
Theorem 1 ; For any Walras equilibrium for an economic environment
A
E , there is a money assignment u £ 7/1 and a corresponding
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Nash equilibrium, a, for (E, v) where the consumption outcome under
a
» y » is the Walras allocation,
Corollary Is Tor any economic environment E
,
there always exist
a money endowment u and a corresponding Nash equilibrium whose
consumption outcome y is Pareto efficient.
Before stating another corollary, let us define the following.
Definition 4 ; A money endowment jj is called essentially positive if there
exists e > such that y(t) 2 e a.e.t in T.
Definition 5 : A commodity endowment w is called essentially bounded if
for each i = I,.,.,n there exists M, > such that w (t) < M. a.e. t in T.
1 - 1
Corollary 2: For any economic environment E and an essentially
positive money endowment u and an essentiall]? bounded w
,
there always exist a Nash equilibrium whose consumption outcome
Y is a Walras allocation for E and is Pareto efficient.
Therefore, if the initial money assignment is correctly chosen*
our market mechanism can attain a Pareto efficient allocation. However, as
will be shown in an example later, even if the correct profile of money
(i.e., uniformly positive money endowment) is assigned, an inefficient
Nash equilibrium may result. This interests one in characterizing the
differences between efficient and inefficient Nash equilibria.
Definit ion 5: A Nash equilibrium T-strategy a is called fcrs table with
respect to (E, y) if for almost all t 6 T , t's best strategy s * c(t)
does not change even if his initial money assignment u(t) is increased.
Definition 5 : A Nash equilibrium a « -__ (x f £) is called non-trivial ir
fx * V i and j^
1
i ¥ i .
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Theorem 2: The consumption allocation of a #f-s table non-trivial
Nash equilibrium for (E, y) is a Walras equilibrium allocation
for E .
Corollary 3 : The consumption allocation of aflx-stable non-trivial
Nash equilibrium is Pareto efficient.
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III , PROOFS
Proof of Theorem Is
Let E be given. Let y and p be a Walras equilibrium for
E
. Choose u 6 M such that for a.e.t in T ,
£ * E p
1
* Max [v
L
(t) - w
X
(t), 0] < y(t)
i"!
for some 6 > . Let
j^Ct) = €• p
1
• Max [^(t) - w^t), 0]
and
^(t) - Max [0, C/(t) - ^(t)] .
Then obviously a(t) - (x(t), lit)) £ £ and a(t) £ a (a) D 3 (a) .
The market allocation rules give us the consumption outcome y which is
the Walras equilibrium. By Definition 1, it is a Nash equilibrium, Q*E.D.
Proof o f Coro-lary 1:
Straightforward from Theorem 1 and assumption A. Q.E.D.
Proof o f Corollary 2
:
Straightforward from the proof of Theorem 1., Q.E.D*
Let us present an example which shows that the converse of
Corollary 2 does not hold. Namely, let us show that even if u is
strictly positive, a Nash equilibrium may not correspond to a Walras equilibrium
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"1 O T ***
Example : Let E be such that n = 2 , u (c , c ) ~ c ° c for all
t
€
T
,
w(t) - <
j
(0
,
1) if t
€
[0 , 1/2]
1(1 ,0) t 6 (1/2 ,
Let u(t) = 1/2 for all t . Then E satisfies (A) and jj is strictly
positive. It is easy to show that there is a Walras equilibrium (y» p)
"11 12 12
such that y(t) » (x , 5) for all t £ T and p = (p , p*") with p p
Equilibrium consumption allocation y is unique and equilibrium
price vector p is unique up to a scaler multiplication. By Corollary 2,
there exists a corresponding Nash equilibrium whose consumption outcome is
Y . Indeed, a T-strategy a = (x, C) is a Nash equilibrium if
1
(| ,0) if t 6 [0 » |l
X(t) «{
, |) if t 6 (j , 1]
and
!
(0 , J) if t
€
[0 , i]
1 /. <_
S(t) -(
v' 2
(i , 0) if t € Is . 1]
However, this is not the unique Nash equilibrium. For example,
I
1
*' «* *» 1
define a - (x , t ) such that for some e with < e < r
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<k , 0) if t € [0 , ~]
x (t) -
.
i) if t
€
(J
.
13
(0 , e) if t
€
[0 , |j
C (t) -
I
(e , 0) if t
€
(i 1]
is a Nash equilibrium. The corresponding consumption outcome, y , is
f(e , 1-e) if t 6 [0 , J]
Y <t) «<
[(1-e , e) if t 6 (| . 1]
This situation could be understood in the following way. Let us
' 2
consider the usual Walras economy. The price p *(-,-) is the Walras
equilibrium price. However, traders cannot transmit the signal corresponding
to the Walras demand (or national demand) because they do not have enough
amount of money. Hence, the. actual demand signal, x (t)
(or effective demand) falls short of the Walras demand and hence the con-
cumption outcome becomes non-Walrasian. This situation may be ameliorated
if we allow traders to borrow money. If we do, traders will choose Walras
signals instead and Walras consumption will result as a Nash equilibrium.
In this sense,a trader's inclination to borrow is an important characteristics
of non-Walrasian (and hence inefficient) Nash equilibrium, '/^-stability
defined in the previous section implies the non-existence of inclination to
borrow.
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Proof of Theorem 2
Let a * (Xj 5) be an /^-stable Nash equilibrium for (S, y) and
A n i <*- i r* i
Y its consumption outcome. Let p £ K be such that p ~ Jx /}£> for
all i .
3 *
Note that < p < « ¥ i because a is a non-trivial Nash
Equilibrium. By the definitions of a , £ and Nash Equilibrium, a.e.t
t t
in T u fy(t)) > u (c) for all c such that (1) c
€
R, » (2) pc < pw(t) ,
t ~ t T ~
and (3) I p
X
- Max [0 , c
1
- w^t) ] £ S(t).
i=l
However, since a is $l-s table, (3) is not an effective constraint
for a.e.t in T . In other words, (p, y) is a Walrasian equilibrium.
Q.E.D.
Proof of the Corollary :
Straightforward from Theorem 2
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